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1. Introduction
National economies are increasingly linked to the world economy through trade and
investment. Among the most important decisions of multinationals are how much to invest
and where and in which country to locate their headquarters. These decisions are
influenced by tax policy, particularly how countries tax income from foreign investment.
National economies recognize the importance of keeping their tax systems competitive.
The established developed countries face the challenge of the economies in transition
countries and tax havens. Estonia is a prime example of the former in that it does not tax
undistributed corporate profits at all. Among developed economies Ireland appeals to
foreign direct investment with her low rate of corporation tax. Corporate inversions,
multinationals relocating the host country of their parent companies, have been seized
upon in the U.S. tax debate. The recent German tax reform was partially designed in
response to the tax minimization strategies of multinationals by exempting the realized
capital gains of their equity holdings from corporation tax to improve Germany’s
attractiveness as a business location.
Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja (2002) analyse the conditions that would provide multinationals
with tax neutrality in financial and dividend policies and which consequently would treat all
investment projects neutrally in the comprehensive income tax sense. The distorting
aspect of the problem is analysed here. The focus is on the incentive effects caused by
linking differing national tax systems with possibly differing effective tax rates on similar
economic activity. The economic definition of income is assumed to be the tax base in
each jurisdiction. Therefore, the consequences of such obvious tax asymmetries as
claiming the expenses of an activity in a high tax rate country and channelling the
revenues from the same activity to a low tax rate country are not addressed.
The model is made up of investments by the multinational through its foreign subsidiary
and of their different sources of financing. Not only new share issues, profit finance and
debt from the parent company, but also debt and undistributed profits from a special
finance company, located in a third country, are allowed as sources of external finance to
the subsidiary. The financial activities of the parent company are an integral part of the
model. Therefore, the tax treatment of foreign-source income during its repatriation to the
parent and onward distribution to its shareholders in contrast to domestically generated2
income are the focus.  The modelling is motivated by the imputation system with
equalization tax, but is general enough to be applicable to other corporation tax systems
with similar constructions. Equalization tax guarantees that any home-country destination
dividends are taxed in the home country at the same rate than the rate of imputation.
Other problems of interest are factors which explain the existence of special finance
companies in third countries and corporate inversions.
The standard dividend tax capitalization hypothesis of applied tax theory, the “trapped
equity” approach, is used and extended to the international framework to derive the
relevant cost of capital formulae.
1 The “dividend tax” contains all possible elements: the
differential corporation tax on distributions in the host country of the subsidiary, taxes
during the repatriation of foreign-source income, the differential dividend tax (including
possible imputation credits) levied on shareholders from their effective capital gains tax
rate. This approach makes it possible to value consistently the opportunity cost of profits
generated by the multinational in different jurisdictions, but used perhaps in other units to
finance investment projects.
One kind of dividend tax is the equalization tax on onward-distributed foreign-source
income. It is shown to operate slightly differently from repatriation taxes because it can be
avoided by transforming such profits into taxable profits of the home country investments
which can be distributed without equalization tax.
Alworth (1988) and Keen (1991) were among the first to analyse the investment decisions
of multinational companies using a dynamic investment model. Sørensen (1990) studied
the same problem by extending the static King-Fullerton approach to international
investments. Some years earlier, however, Sinn (1984) and Hartman (1985) presented the
trapped equity argument in the international framework. They claim that taxes on cross-
border dividend payments will not affect a subsidiary’s cost of capital even where equity is
the marginal source of finance. The cost of capital is rather determined by home and
foreign country corporate taxes. Later Sinn (1993) introduced a model to analyse the
impact of international taxation on the growth of a foreign subsidiary. Hines (1994) applies
the same model basis to analyse the incentive created by the credit and deferral system to
                                                
1 Everyone familiar with King (1977) recognizes the source of the methodology.3
tax foreign earnings. Weichenrieder (1995) analysed several separate issues, among them
incentives created by the German imputation system in the case of a multinational
company and incentives for profit shifting created by the international tax system. Tax
planning using financing vehicles is one of the questions on which there is little economic
analysis. However, Giovannini (1989) gives an extensive account of such third-country
structures, and a recent study by European Commission (2001) presents calculations
about the effects of such strategies on the cost of capital of multinationals.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the familiar cost of capital
concepts of a parent and its foreign subsidiaries. The tools are directly applied in Section 3
to modify the cost of capital formulae of the subsidiary when finance is raised through the
a third country finance company.  Section 4 summarizes the tax cost ranking of investment
projects in terms of sources and channels of finance from the point of view of the
multinational as a whole. Section 5 looks at such topical problems as what factors explain
the existence of the third country finance company, corporate inversions, special financial
operations carried out within the parent, the analyses of which either follow directly from
the general simple set-up of this paper or need only a modest re-specification of the
original concepts. In particular, we show the equalization tax to affect the cost of capital of
an investment in the home country, but financed from repatriated foreign-profits. Section 6
contains a summary of the main findings and a concluding policy discussion.
2. Multinational investment decisions
We allow for the possibility that the countries of residence (r-country) of the final financiers
(owners and debtors) of the multinational, the home country (h-country) of the parent
company, the foreign countries (f-country) hosting the subsidiaries engaged in productive
activities, and the third country (t-country) hosting a finance company that possibly has the
legal ownership of the subsidiaries and also provides finance to them may all be different
























(i) Equity raised from the market: A corporation with internationally dispersed ownership
operates in its h-country and contemplates setting up a subsidiary in the f-country. If the
parent company raises finance through an equity issue, it can use it either in the h- or f-
country. An investment in the f-country must give the owners the same marginal post-tax
return as on their alternative financial asset:
(2.1) ( ) ( )r MRR
b f f hf t t q - = - 1 1
where 
hf q  denotes the post-tax dividend accruing to the shareholders of the parent from
one euro’s dividend from the subsidiary taking into account all taxes during the repatriation
and onward distribution phases, 
f t  denotes the f-country corporation tax rate, 
f MRR  =
the marginal pre-tax real rate of return after true economic depreciation on investment in
the f-country, r  = the pre-tax real rate of interest on the alternative financial investment,
and 
b t  denotes the owners’ personal tax rate on real interest income in their r-countries.















  (new issues on f-equity)
2
The detailed definition of 
hf q  is given below after the general structure of the cost of
capital formulae has been established.
If the proceeds of the new share issue are invested by the parent in the h-country, the h-
country corporation tax rate 
h t  replaces 
f t  in (2.1), while 
hf q  is replaced by 
h q , reflecting
the post-tax dividend accruing to the shareholders in the parent from one euro’s post-tax
profit generated by the h-country investment, taking into account the possible imputation














(new issues on h-equity)
If d
ht denotes the repatriation and onward distribution taxes, then q
hf and q
h are related by
q
hf = (1- d
ht)q
h.
The proceeds of the new issue can also be invested in the f-country subsidiary in the form
of debt from the parent. Each period in which it repatriates an amount of interest 
hf b  from
the subsidiary such that, after paying all taxes 
hf r  during repatriation and in the h-country,
the available post-tax dividend stream just equals the shareholders’ return on the
alternative financial asset:
(2.4) ( ) ( )r b
b hf hf t r q
h - = - 1 1
                                                
2 Here we stick to the traditional definition of the cost of capital of new issues as an opportunity cost in the
financial markets, unlike Sinn (1993) who takes into account the time path of utilizing the exogenous internal
investment opportunities in the subsidiary and equates the cost of capital to the marginal Tobin’s q of the
subsidiary.6
If the fraction 
f b  of repatriated interest 
hf b  is deductible from the f-country corporation tax
base, the minimum real rate of return 
f MRR in the f-country subsidiary is such that the
economic profit is zero:
(2.5) ( ) 0 = - - -
hf f f f hf f b MRR b MRR b t
Substituting for 
























      (new issues on f-debt)
(ii) Profits of the parent: If the parent uses undistributed profits to finance its investments,
the opportunity cost of one euro of such funds to the owners is 
h q , their post-personal tax
dividend if one euro of post-corporation tax profit were distributed. Its mirror image is the
market valuation 
h g  of one euro of post-tax undistributed profit. In arbitrage equilibrium the
market price 
h g  must be such that investors are indifferent between pocketing the post-tax
dividends or selling their shares. Then they realize a post-tax capital gain of  ( )
h g t
g - 1  per
euro of post-tax profit of the corporation, 
g t  being the ownership share-weighted accrual-
equivalent tax rate on undistributed profit. Hence the no-arbitrage condition
(2.7) ( )
h h q g t = -
g 1










When the ownership of the parent company is internationally dispersed, the question rises
about the investors whose marginal tax rates determine 
h g . Unlike the traditional
assumption in applied tax research, Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja (2002) adopt the view that
no single owner category determines 
h g , but all market participants are marginal ones.7
Therefore the personal dividend tax is weighted by the ownership shares of the investors’
effective tax rates, reflecting the imperfect granting of the imputation credits on foreign
destination dividends. As in Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja (2002), the ownership shares are
assumed to be good proxies for the weights derived from theoretical models on ex-
dividend day share price behaviour (Michaely and Vila 1995).
3
When the parent company refrains from a dividend distribution of one euro and instead
invests it as equity in a foreign subsidiary, the shareholder’s wealth increases by 
h g  euros.
The investment yields a post-tax dividend stream to the shareholder equal to
( )
f f hf MRR t q - 1  in every future period, assuming the true depreciation to be continuously
reinvested, which maintains the income generating power of the asset intact. The
company invests up to the point at which the real rate of return on investment in the f-
country equals the post-tax return on the shareholder’s alternative financial asset:










The pre-tax cost of capital on the f-country equity investment financed from a marginal
euro of post-tax profit retained by the parent is thus

























=   (parent profits on f-equity)















(parent profits on h-retention)
                                                
3 Support for such an “all traders are marginal” view is provided by Liljeblom, Löflund and Hedvall (2001) in a
market with tax heterogeneity among foreign and domestic investors. They find that arbitrage in companies
with equal amounts of domestic and foreign owners forces a price drop to values within the common no-
arbitrage interval, but may deviate from it in companies where a certain investor category dominates.8
If the parent’s profits finance the f-country subsidiary in the form of debt, the owners’
wealth increment is 
h g . Therefore, the onward-distributed post-tax dividend stream from
the repatriated interest 
h q (1-
hf r )
hf b  must give the same post-tax rate of return as their
alternative financial asset:












Solving (2.12) again for 
hf b  and substituting it into condition (2.5), the minimum real rate of
return 
























(parent profits on f-debt)
(iii) Profits of the subsidiary: When post-tax profits generated by the subsidiary are
invested, the owners sacrifice 
hf q  of post-tax dividend income per euro of post-corporation
tax profit of the subsidiary, but see their wealth increase by 











which is analogous to condition (2.8). Therefore, the minimum 
f MRR  is determined by a
similar argument as in (2.9), but substituting 
f g  for 
h g . Because of (2.14), 
hf q  appears
both in the numerator and denominator of the expression. The pre-tax cost of capital on
















This is the “trapped equity” argument in the international setting. The cost of capital for
investment financed from internal funds in the subsidiary does not depend on any dividend9
taxes. Dividend distributions on equity accumulated from undistributed post-tax profits no
longer face “dividend tax” (1-
hf q ), because “dividend tax” is already deducted from the
share price 
f g at the moment of profit retention. Similarly, if the f-country profits are
repatriated and invested in the h-country, the cost of capital (2.11) continues to hold,
because the payment of the repatriation phase “dividend tax” accordingly increases the
market valuation factor from 
f g  to 
h g . This is the cost of capital side of the trapped equity
argument in the international framework. Repatriation taxes do not affect the incentive for
repatriating the f-country profits. In section 5 below we shall examine briefly how the role of
equalization tax differs in this respect.
(iv) Debt from the market: If it is the subsidiary which raises debt finance directly in the
financial market at the rate of interest  r , the minimum 
f MRR  follows from (2.5) by














If debt is issued by the parent company, the minimum 
h MRR  on the h-country debt-













We do not consider the alternative of using the proceeds from the h-country debt issue on
the f-country equity and f-debt in order to minimize duplication of our formulae, because
the finance company established in the t-country is introduced in the following.
3. Special Financing Vehicle
There are many reasons for the existence of financing companies inside multinationals.
This section develops tools for the analysis of their role using the cost of capital approach.
We recognize two kinds of host countries for finance companies: (i) tax havens which have10
a partial network of bilateral tax treaties to prevent double-taxation of foreign-source
income, but which typically have a very low rate of corporation tax to maximize their tax
revenue, and (ii) those tax treaty countries which have a classical corporation tax at
regular rates, but exempt foreign-source dividends from their corporation tax, including
realization gains by holding companies, and apply the credit method to foreign source
interest income. The equity stake of financing companies is assumed to be close to nil. It
would be straightforward to analyse this from the above.
(i) Debt issues: The finance company itself is assumed to raise funding from the proceeds
of debt issues in the market. Therefore, if such funds are injected into the subsidiary as
debt, the parent needs to repatriate the amount ( ) r b
tf tf = -r 1  of interest income per euro
borrowed to pay the necessary interest expenses in the t-country, with 
tf r  possibly
different from 
hf r , where 
tf r  includes the t-country corporation tax and the effect of the
possible interest deductibility. Substituting  ( )
tf r r - 1 /  for 
hf b  in the no-profit condition (2.5),
the following 















If the finance company injects equity into the subsidiary, the no-profit condition (2.5)
changes into ( )( ) 0 1 1 = - - - r MRR
f f tf t d  which leads to









tf d  stands for the tax rate on equity income during the repatriation phase from the f-
to the t-country including the effect of the t-country corporation tax.
(ii) Profit finance: The finance company accumulates profits (foreign-source dividends and
realization gains accumulated thereby), because it acquires legal ownership of some of the
multinational’s subsidiaries. The cost of capital formulae for such profit finance are11
constructed along the familiar lines. Such income has been subject to the repatriation tax




















per euro, where 
ht d consists of repatriation and onward distribution phase taxes within the
multinational. Analogously to (2.10) and (2.13), the cost of capital formulae financed from
such profits are thus as follows
(3.4a) ( )


































If profit is repatriated from the t-country to the h-country and the repatriation tax 
ht d  is
paid,  ( )
ht d - 1 / 1  of euros must be sent from the t-country to have one euro for investment
in the h-country. The owners’ wealth increases accordingly by the factor  ( )
ht d - 1 / 1  from g 
t
 to 
h g . Therefore, the “trapped equity” cost of capital (2.11) follows.
4. Tax comparisons of cost of capital
Each cost of capital formula above can be written equivalently by grossing up the post-tax
rate of interest on the alternative financial asset. Therefore the project MRRs are
compared by their numerators. To facilitate closer scrutiny of them, recall the definition
( )
hf hf d q q
h - = 1  above where 
hf d  is made up of the following elements:
in the repatriation phase
- the f-country withholding tax in cases of exemption and excess credits
- the extra h-country corporation tax in cases of deficit credits, and
in the onward distribution phase12
- the possible equalization tax equal to the imputation credit on the h-country destination
dividends, assuming that the f-country destination dividends are relieved of it.
Similar considerations apply to 
ht d  in cases of t-country source dividends, as evident from
condition (3.3).
There are four elements that affect the cost of capital comparisons:
(i) the investor-level post-tax euros after
- effective dividend tax 
h q
- effective accrual-equivalent capital gain tax  ( )
g t - 1
- effective interest income tax ( )
b t - 1
(ii) the multinational-level post-tax euros of foreign-source income, combining the effect of
the f-country corporation tax and repatriation and onward-distribution taxes as defined
above
- equity income ( )( )
f hf t d - - 1 1  or ( )( )
f tf t d - - 1 1
- interest income ( )( )
f hf t r - - 1 1  or ( )( )
f tf t r - - 1 1
(iii) the multinational-level post-tax euro of domestic-source income
- h-country corporation tax (1-t
h)
(iv) the degree of deductibility of the real interest expenses 
f b  and 
h b .
In all comparisons below the f-country rate 
f t  of corporation tax is assumed to be not
higher than the h-country one 
h t .
New issue finance: The relevant cost of capital expressions are (2.2), (2.3) and (2.6),
having the tax multipliers
(4.1a) f-equity:  ( )( )
f hf t d q
h - - 1 1
(4.1b) h-equity:  ( )
h t q
h - 1
(4.1c) f-debt:  ) 1 /( ) 1 )( 1 (
f f f hf t b t r q
h - - -
Consider first whether to allocate the proceeds from new issues on f-equity or h-equity.
The repatriation and onward distribution phase taxes on a return of f-equity may then13
outweigh the possible lower f-country corporation tax compared to that in the h-country
4
except for the case of deficit credits when the return on f-equity is effectively taxed at the
h-country rate 
h t . This comparison of the multinational level post-tax euro of foreign-
source versus domestic-source income is called the base case.
Consider next the alternative to allocate the proceeds from new issues on f-debt. With
interest deductibility  1 =
f b  and with the h-country crediting the f-country withholding tax
on interest income against its corporation tax, the returns on h-equity and f-debt are taxed
the same. Therefore the issue whether to channel the funds on f-equity or f-debt is
equivalent to the base case. Without interest deductibility  0 =
f b , the repatriation taxes on
interest income 
hf r being logically zero when the h-country applies exemption, the return
on f-debt and f-equity will be subject to equalization tax when distributed onward. Whether
to invest the funds in the f- or h-country reduces to the base case comparison. When the
h-country credits the f-country taxes against its corporation tax, the returns on h-equity, f-
equity and f-debt are taxed the same.
Profit finance from the parent: Its uses are given in (2.10), (2.11) and (2.13) with the tax
multipliers
(4.2a) f-equity: ( )( )( )
f hf g t d t - - - 1 1 1
(4.2b) f-debt: ( )( )( ) ( )
f f f hf g t b t r t - - - - 1 / 1 1 1
(4.2c) h-retentions: ( )( )
h g t t - - 1 1 .
Profit finance from the subsidiary, condition (2.15) has the tax multiplier
(4.2d) f-retentions: ( )( )
f g t t - - 1 1 .
                                                
4 Estonia, for instance, has a 35.14 per cent tax rate on distributed dividends and repatriated
realization gains (if at least 75 per cent of the sold subsidiary is made up of real estate assets)
although the corporation tax rate is zero. Dividends are exempt from Finnish corporation tax, but
subject to equalization tax. Therefore, equity investment in Estonia from the proceeds of a new
issue by a Finnish multinational is tax-disadvantaged compared to equity investment directly by its14
From (4.2a-d) it is clear that if interest expenses are not deductible from the tax base in the
f-country  0 =
f b , the expressions (4.2a-b) differ from (4.2c-d) due to the potential
repatriation tax 
hf d  or 
hf r . The taxation of f-equity and f-debt differ if the repatriation tax
rates on their returns are different, and the comparison of investing the parent’s profit
either in the f-subsidiary or in the h-country is as in the base case. If debt interest
expenses are deductible  1 =
f b , channelling profits from the parent to the f-subsidiary
debt depends on the repatriation tax on interest income in relation to the corporation tax
rate in the h-country. Under the credit method they are equal 
hf r =
h t , so that f-debt and h-
retentions are taxed the same. Thus the comparison between f-equity and f-debt reduces
to the base case.
If the profits generated by the f-subsidiary are not reinvested in the f-country, but are
repatriated and invested in the h-country, the standard cost of capital for a project financed
from the h-country profits, condition (2.11) above, continues to hold, because the payment
of the repatriation phase “dividend tax” accordingly increases the market valuation factor of
such profits from 
f g  to 
h g .
Profits from the finance company: The relevant formulae (3.4a-b) have the following tax
multipliers:
(4.3a) f-equity: ( )( )( )
f tf g t d t - - - 1 1 1
(4.3b) f-debt: ( )( )( ) ( )
f f f tf g t b t r t - - - - 1 / 1 1 1 .
With a low r
tf (low rate of corporation tax in the t-country) and with interest deductibility
b
f=1, t-country profits will be invested in f-debt rather than either in f-equity or repatriated
and retained in the h-country, condition (4.2c). This is again a base case comparison. If r
tf
corresponds to a regular corporation tax rate, f-debt is taxed as h-country profits. Whether
to allocate t-country profits on f-equity or f-debt is the base case. Without interest
deductibility similar considerations apply as in the case of profit finance from the parent.
                                                                                                                                                                 
Finnish owners without the multinational and equalization tax. But, even the latter would rather
invest in their h-equity (taxed once) than in Estonian equity (double-taxed).15
Debt issue in the market: In cases of t-country-raised debt, formulae (3.1) and (3.2), the
tax multipliers are:
(4.4a) f-equity: ( )( )( )
f tf b t d t - - - 1 1 1
(4.4b) f-debt: ( )( )( ) ( )
f f f tf b t b t r t - - - - 1 / 1 1 1
and for h-country debt from (2.17):
(4.4c) h-debt: ( )( ) ( )
h h h b t b t t - - - 1 / 1 1
and for f-country debt from (2.16):
(4.4d) f-debt: ( )( ) ( )
f f f b t b t t - - - 1 / 1 1 .
Contrasting (4.4b) with (4.4c) and (4.4d), the repatriation tax on foreign-source income
means that the h- and f-countries favoured by the multinational for tax reasons over the t-
country are the markets in which debt issues are sold.
Consider next the problem of the funding source of f-equity. Contrasting (4.1a) and (4.2a),
we observe that it is the investor-level tax rate of capital gains vs. dividends which
determines whether f-equity is funded from the profits of the parent or from the proceeds of
new share issues, because the repatriation-phase tax is the same for both sources of
funds. Add condition (4.3a). If the t-country has a low rate of corporation tax, a low
repatriation tax, the t-country as a source of funding f-equity is tax-disadvantaged, if the h-
country applies either the exemption or pure credit method, meaning her nil repatriation
tax.
The question of whether outside finance to the subsidiary is channelled in the form of f-
equity or f-debt depends on a similar type of consideration as the base case between f-
equity vs. h-equity. In the case of taxing the return on f-debt, the repatriation tax rate r
hf is
in practice the same as the h-country corporation tax rate (due to the credit method).16
Therefore we do not find any massive tax incentives to invest in the f-country in the form of
debt, except for t-debt from the t-profits of a country with a low d
tf.
5. Finance vehicles and corporate inversions
Here we will shed some more light on the factors determining the existence of t-country
finance companies and the typical headquarter financial operations of multinationals. One
of the topical issues in the taxation of multinationals is the potential relocation of their
headquarters, the problem of corporate inversion.
(i) Why do t-country finance companies exist? Above we observed that the t-country
finance company is tax-disadvantaged as a market of debt issues, but has a role in
allocating its profits on f-debt if the t-country has a low corporation tax rate, meaning a low
r
tf. The same condition implies that the t-country is tax-disadvantaged as a source of
funding f-equity if the h-country applies either the exemption or pure credit method,
meaning a d
hf  of nil. This view is too simple because all subsidiaries are considered to be
going concerns and equity income is always repatriated as dividends.
Yet the essential nature of the multinational is that it manages a portfolio of subsidiaries
which are bought and sold. Therefore, the return on the f-country equity is also repatriated
as realized capital gains, which
- are often not subject to any f-country withholding tax, but may face time
  restrictions on repatriation
- are most often taxed in the h-country at the corporation tax rate 
h t  on their full nominal
amount.
One set of t-countries exempts foreign-source dividends and realization gains. The other
taxes them at low rates of corporation tax (tax havens). Both sets are ideal host countries
of finance companies that temporarily park revenue from the trade sale of a subsidiary
without immediate high taxes. Such trade sales may contain goodwill gains and losses
compared to their book values.17
Thus one feature explaining the existence of t-country finance companies may be to
distinguish capital gains tax on retained earnings from that on goodwill, which is seldom
done by tax economists. Officer (1982) is the exception, with Ball (1984) arguing on similar
lines. A tax on realized goodwill is also an implicit tax on the future cash flows which cause
a goodwill gain. If cash flows are taxed comprehensively without depreciating goodwill
against such tax, the tax on the realized capital gain leads to excessive taxation of the
future dividends and capital gains generated by the asset (subsidiary) in question.
This is why according to the old continental tradition long-term capital gains are not taxed
in countries such as Switzerland and the Netherlands (and were not taxed in Finland
before 1985 nor in the UK before April 1965). Irving Fisher pointed this out too. If the
running yield of an asset (bond, forest, share) is already taxed comprehensively, a tax on
the realized gain will break the neutrality of comprehensive income tax.
(ii) Parent company financial decisions: Post-corporation tax income generated in the h-
country is ideal for dividend distributions because then the parent company need not pay
equalization tax on the h-country destination dividends, which repatriated dividends may
be subject to. So the latter must be either transformed into h-country-taxed income by
investing such funds in marketable securities in the h-country, the return on which can be
distributed as dividends without equalization tax (Weichenrieder 1998) or used to
repurchase shares in the parent company and cancel them, in which case the owners
receive their return in the form of capital gains or reinvested back in some other f-country
where the promised 
f MRR  exceeds the relevant cost of capital.
If repatriated dividends that were subject to equalization tax when distributed onward are
instead invested in the h-country, Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja (2003) show equalization tax
to drive the cost of capital of such funds below the one of domestic profits of the
multinational. Due to the equalization tax, one euro of post-tax f- or t-profits would give rise
to a dividend of 1/(1+t
e) of a euro. Therefore, net dividend q
ef is only a fraction 1/(1+ t
e) of
h q in (2.7) and g
ef  likewise only a fraction 1/(1+ t
e) of 
h g  in (2.8). This amends the basic
arbitrage condition as (2.9) into18












from which the minimum required real rate of return MRR
eh  follows
(5.2)      
) 1 )(( 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 (

















=      (f-profits on h-investment)
The final expression is due to the fact that 
e t = u/(1-u) with u = the rate of imputation.
Equalization tax capitalizes onto the value of foreign-source profits, but because it is an
avoidable tax by the h-country investment activity, it reduces the cost of capital of such
funds in the h-country
5. Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja (2003) analyse also other aspects of
equalization tax that potentially distort the transfer pricing decisions of the multinational.
But from the above situation it directly follows that repatriation and onward distribution
taxes can be avoided by pricing the inputs sent from the h-country to the f-country, if
( ) ( )( )
f hf h t d t - - > - 1 1 1  holds true.
(iii) Corporate inversions:  One strategic decision concerns corporate inversion. Under
what condition would the parent company switch from the h-country to the t-country? This
is an issue in the USA, in particular, but is also topical in the European policy debate. The
problem can be directly analysed by the tools developed above to explain the existence of
separate finance companies. In the USA the question seems to be why the legal residence
of the parent switches from the USA to a tax haven while the normal headquarter
operations stay. This is solely a problem of taxing income from capital and foreign-source
income in particular. In the high-tax Northern European policy debate both the switch of
headquarter operations and the legal residence of the parent to a lower tax country are at
issue. This problem has to do with the tax system as a whole and not least the taxation of
earned income of professionals employed in the headquarters of multinationals
                                                
5 Weichenrieder (1998) in fact derives the same cost of capital as (5.2) but does not observe the equalization
tax to increase the incentive for domestic investment. Instead, he is interested in the depressing effect on
domestic investment of a reduction in the rate of imputation and therefore in the future tax benefits from such
an investment.19
We identify above two kinds of t-countries: tax havens with a low rate of corporation tax
and countries with corporation tax at regular rates, but exempting foreign-source dividends
and realization gains. The latter group typically taxes earned income at about the same
rate as the Northern European h-countries. Therefore they mostly host finance vehicles. In
addition, legislation does not allow the main headquarter operations and legal tax
residence of the parent to be in separate countries. In the USA there does not seem to be
such a link. Therefore tax havens are attractive relocation countries for the parents of US
multinationals. But corporate inversions are not only caused by a low rate of corporation
tax in the t-country. Other economic forces derive from the rules on how the USA taxes
foreign-source income compared to the t-country.
The two most often mentioned problems (Desai and Hines Jr. 2002, for example) of the
US system are the following. The first relates to the imperfect crediting of foreign corporate
taxes due to reallocating interest on debt raised in the USA against the US tax on foreign-
source income (push factor). This causes 
hf d to be considerably non-zero in the state of
permanent “excess credits”. The additional contributing factor
6 is that the USA more often
than its competitors does not offer deferral benefits to those profits which are retained and
reinvested in the foreign subsidiary or in its host country, but taxes them widely on an
accrual basis (CFC legislation). Tax benefits are obtained from the switch if 
tf d  is
permanently lower than 
hf d . A similar tax benefit derives from avoiding equalization tax, if
the parent relocates from the country of the imputation system to one with classical
corporation tax
.
Second, after the headquarter switch to the third country, the US operations are typically
financed from loans from the new parent company. Therefore, due to the deductibility of
debt interest, US corporate taxes are reduced while the USA cannot levy any withholding
tax on such interest payments due to bilateral tax treaties. Therefore the switch becomes
more attractive (pull factor). The tax benefit stream obtains from the lower 
tf r  (the USA is
an f-country after the switch) on repatriated interest in contrast to equity income being
taxed at the US rate of corporation tax 
h t  before the switch.
                                                
6 The easiness to transfer the ownership of immaterial rights to a low tax country is also a contributing factor
to a relocation.20
Our analysis above also reveals a third source of tax savings. Foreign-source interest
income from the portfolio of subsidiaries is effectively taxed in the USA at the rate of the
US corporation tax, but in tax havens at their low rate 
tf r . This may be a sizeable effect.
The tax cost of corporate inversions is the capital gains tax of the owners when selling
their shares in the old parent company to the new one. Due to increasing institutional
ownership such taxes may be quickly recovered by the owners as higher future dividends.
Thus interest deductibility globally is the major source contributing to the tax benefits of
corporate inversions. Eliminating both interest deductibility and the taxation of realized
capital gains within the corporate sector would make special finance companies in the t-
countries unnecessary and headquarter switches unprofitable, because both interest and
equity income would then be taxed at source at regular rates.
6. Conclusion
Taxes during the repatriation and onward distribution phase of foreign-source income can
outweigh the possibly lower foreign corporation tax rate compared to that of the home
country when the problem is to invest the proceeds from new share issues either in the
country hosting the foreign subsidiary or the parent company. Foreign equity will tend to be
funded from the profits of the parent, if the owners of the parent company face a lower
effective rate on capital gains than on dividends, but the repatriation and onward
distribution taxes within the multinational do not affect the choice.
We cannot detect any large tax benefits in the use of loans from the parent to fund foreign
subsidiaries except for loans from finance companies. Due to the repatriation-phase tax on
foreign-source income, both the home and foreign country are favoured by the
multinational over the third country as the markets where debt issues are sold. The
existence of finance companies in third countries may be mainly explained by their low or
nil tax rate - in contrast to the home-country corporation tax rate - on realized capital gains
from the actively managed portfolio of foreign subsidiaries of the multinational. The low21
corporation tax rate of tax havens and interest deductibility globally explain corporate
inversions - relocations of headquarters.
The parent company distributes dividends from income generated in the home country to
avoid paying equalization tax on onward-distributed foreign-source dividends. The latter
are used to repurchase its own shares or invested in home country securities to earn
taxable home country income which can be distributed without equalization tax. Such
foreign-source dividends are shown to carry a lower cost of capital than domestic-source
profits.
We conclude that in the world as a whole
a.  interest income tends to go untaxed because of (i) the deductibility of interest
expenses in the foreign and home country and (ii) non-taxed pension funds and
institutions being the major final investors on corporate debt; removing (i) globally
would guarantee the single-taxation of interest income without any role for tax
havens
b.  the legal ownership of subsidiaries tends to be concentrated in third countries which
do not include realized gains on long-term assets in their corporation tax base;
removing such a tax in the home countries would eliminate the need to use third-
country investment vehicles. Such a move would likely enhance repatriation flows to
the home country and would increase world efficiency by removing the incentive to
maintain finance companies in third countries
c.  wither personal taxes on investment income (interest, dividends, capital gains)
because such a move would eliminate the tax discrimination of direct household
ownership over non-taxed pension funds and institutions.22
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